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Introduction
My	doctoral	work	on	the	birth	environment	
is	the	‘terrain’	in	which	this	paper	moves.	
This	practice-based	architectural	project	is	
focused	on	returning	to	the	birth	experience		
as	‘embodied’	experience	–	away	from	the	
medicalised	notion	of	the	body	as	‘object’.
As	Robbie	Davis	Floyd	(2004)	has	suggested,	
the	body	(the	woman’s	body)	is	understood,	
in	the	medical	paradigm,	to	be	a	mechanical	
entity…like	a	car…indeed,	a	car	that	needs	
‘fixing’.	Fahy,	Foureur	and	Hastie	(2008)	have	
made	a	strong	case	that	the	environment	
itself	can	influence	birth	processes	–	that	
birthspace	can	influence	birth	processes.	
In	a	symposium	held	at	University	College	
Dublin	in	June	2013,	organised	by	myself	
and	Martina	Hynan,	twenty-six	speakers	
from	across	the	world	address	the	visual	and	
sensory	culture	of	birth,	providing	ample	
evidence	that	birth	is	a	complex	topic	of	
interest	in	the	early	21st	century	(‘www.
reimaginingbirth.com’,	n.d.).	
My	own	project/dissertation	aims	to	re-
imagine	the	birth	environment,	recasting	
it		as	an	architectural	space	of	import	for	
human	being	and	becoming.	Through	
a	studio-based	process	of	exploration,	
‘empathic	observation’,	and	reflection,	I	
have	come	to	an	understanding	of	light		
as ‘affordance’	(Norman,	2015)	within	
birthspace.	The	writings	on	light	by	James	J.	
Gibson	and	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	support	
my	own	practice-based	findings.		
Natural	light	connects	us	to	the	cosmos.	
Contemporary,	institutionalised	birthspace	not	
only	lacks	‘cosmicity’	(connection	to	cosmos	
through	light/darkness/sky)	but	also	deprives	
us	of	‘intimacy’	(connection	to	closeness,	
sensuality,	privacy).		Light	–	understood	
throughout	this	article	as	the	indivisible	trio,	
light,	darkness,	and	colour	–	provides	deeply	
felt	physical	and	metaphysical	presence	that	
is	inextricably	woven	into	our	lived	experience	
within	built	environment.	Thinking	about	light	
is	one	aspect	of	thinking	about	embodied	
perception.	As	designers,	we	are	aware	of	
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the	elements	and	languages	that	we	may	
utilise	in	developing	human	spaces	–	places	
of	meaning	and	sensitivity	–	through	shaping	
material	and	immaterial	architectural	form	
and	space.	Hence,	we	know	that	we	can	create	
and	influence	atmospheres,	moods,	feelings,	
meanings	(e.g.	of	authority,	of	awe,	of	comfort,	
of	angst,	of	calmness,	of	control,	of	delight).	
Our	own	lived	experiences	and	creative	
practices	inform	us	that	our	emotional	and	
physiological	responses	to	environment	are	
not	just	in	the	mind…nor	are	they	just	in	the	
body…we	cannot	really	separate	them	into	
compartments.	Architects	and	designers	do	
know	well	that	we	design	in	order	to	create	
and	influence	settings	and	places,		for	those	
who	live	and	move	within	them.	As	Bruno	Zevi	
(1974,	p.32)	famously	stated,	with	respect	to	
architecture	as	space	for	human	experience,	
“Architecture is environment, the stage on 
which our lives unfold.”
Now,	if	we	agree	that	the	mind	and	body	
are	inseparable,	and	further,	that	the	
environment	(a	cloister	courtyard,	a	sunny	
breakfast	room,		a	Greek	temple	or	a	Shinto	
shrine,	a	Gothic	cathedral,		a	forest,	a	windy	
beach,	a	moonlit	night	in	the	desert,	a	misty	
twilight,	a	warm	hearth)	can	influence	our	
feelings	and	our	thoughts	–	then	we	must	
be	aware	that	mind/body/environment	
are	intricately	connected.	And	here	we	find	
ourselves	in	the	natural	domain	of	the	two	
aforementioned	key	figures	in	the	arena	of	
‘embodiment theory’	–	Maurice	Merleau-
Ponty	and	James	J.	Gibson.	
Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	(1908	–1961)		and	
James	J.	Gibson	(1904-1979)	both	began	to	
think,	in	the	mid-20th	century,	about	the	
intertwining	of	mind/body/environment…
from	their	disparate	places	and	fields:	
Merleau-Ponty	as	a	phenomenological	
philosopher	(in	France)	and	Gibson	as	a	
psychologist	(in	the	US).	Both	were	seeking	to	
understand	visual	perception,	but	both	moved	
into	a	much	deeper	discussion	of	perception	as	
being	‘of	the	body’	–	and	of	the	ways	in	which	
mind,	body	and	environment	were	connected.
Tim	Ingold	(2011,	p.	3)	reminds	us	of	the	
Gibsonian	argument	for	the	interwoven	
and	complex	nature	of	our	environmental	
perception/experience:		
Perception,	Gibson	argued,	is	not	the	
achievement	of	a	mind	in	a	body,	but	of	the	
organism	as	a	whole	in	its	environment,	
and	is	tantamount	to	the	organism’s	own	
exploratory	movement	through	the	world.	
If	mind	is	anywhere,	then	it	is	not	‘inside	the	
head’	rather	than ‘out there’ in	the	world.	To	
the	contrary,	it	is	imminent	in	the	network	of	
sensory	pathways	that	are	set	up	by	virtue	
of	the	perceiver’s	immersion	in	his	or	her	
environment	(Ingold,	2011	p.3).	
George	Lakoff,	a	leading	protagonist	in	
‘embodiment	theory’	has	stated	that	new	
understandings	from	cognitive	sciences	
indicate	that	‘reason’	(which	we	have	
considered	as	a	distinguishing	aspect	of	
being	‘human’)	can	no	longer	be	considered	
“a transcendent feature of the universe or 
of disembodied mind.”	Rather,	it	is	“shaped 
crucially by the peculiarities of our human 
bodies, by the remarkable details of the 
neural structure of our brains, and by the 
specifics of our everyday functioning in the 
world”.	Further,	it	evolves	out	of	our	animal	
nature…and	develops	from	“perceptual and 
motor inference present in lower animals”.	
Reason,	he	adds,	is	“mostly unconscious,” 
“largely metaphoric and imaginative”	and	
“not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged”.	
Lakoff		argues	that	the	embodied	mind	is	
such	that	we	derive	our	conceptual	systems	
by	drawing	upon “the commonalities of our 
bodies and of the environments we live in”.	
Thus	“much of a person’s conceptual system 
is either universal or widespread across 
languages and cultures” (Lakoff,	1999,	pp.4–6).	
It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	further	
elaborate	the	recent	and	rich	history	of	
developing	theories	of	embodiment	and	
embodied	cognition.	However,	we	will	be	
able	to	recognise,	in	the	writings	discussed	
herein,	that	Gibson	and	Merleau-Ponty	were	
key	figures,	in	different	ways,	in	recognising	
that	perception,	cognition	and	experience	are	
embodied.	As	Merlea-Ponty	stated	it:
Insofar	as,	when	I	reflect	on	the	essence	
of	subjectivity,	I	find	it	bound	up	with	that	
of	the	body	and	that	of	the	world,	this	
is	because	my	existence	as	subjectivity	
[=	consciousness]	is	merely	one	with	my	
existence	as	a	body	and	with	the	existence	of	
the	world,	and	because	the	subject	that	I	am,	
when	taken	concretely,	is	inseparable	from	
this	body	and	this	world	(Merleau	Ponty,	
2012,	p.	408	in	Smith,	2013,	p.n.p).
As	my	own	exploratory	research	project	has	
evolved,	its	transdisciplinary	nature	required	
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a	delving	into	diverse	fields.	I	have	engaged	
with	knowledge	from	many	disciplines,	
including	architecture,	art,	design,	art	history,	
aesthetics,	midwifery,	medicine,	anthropology,	
biology,	neuroscience,	epigenetics,	aesthetics,	
existential	phenomenological	philosophy,	
environmental	psychology,	and	more.	As	
I	have	proceeded,	E.O.	Wilson’s	concept	of	
consilience	(‘unity of knowledge’)	(E.O	Wilson,	
1998),	and	which	transdisciplinary	theorists	
embrace,	has	become	important	to	my	
approach.	
Of	course,	architecture	is	by	its	nature	an	
interdisciplinary	field,	and	as	Kate	Nesbitt	
(1996,	p.28)	has	pointed	out,	architectural	
theory	has,	in	one	of	its	strains,	developed	
along	phenomenological	lines,	moving	from	
an	earlier	focus	on	issues	of	physical	site	
towards	the	body	in	environment.	Though	
she	does	not	mention	Gibson	and	Merleau-
Ponty,	one	can	feel	their	ghostly	presence	in	
the	following	passage:
One	aspect	of	this	interdisciplinarity	is	
the	reliance	of	architectural	theory	on	the	
philosophical	method	of	inquiry	known	as	
phenomenology....	this	philosophical	thread	
underlies	postmodern	attitudes	towards	
site,	place,	landscape…	Recent	theory	has	
moved	towards…	the	body’s	interaction	
with	its	environment.	Visual,	tactile,	
olfactory,	and	aural	sensations	are	the	
visceral	part	of	the	reception	of	architecture,	
a	medium	distinguished	by	its	three-
dimensional	presence.
In	engaging	with	the	writings	of	Merleau-
Ponty	and	Gibson,	one	finds	issues	that	
have	provoked	much	debate	in	the	fields	
of	psychology,	but	also	in	industrial	design,	
interaction	design	and	further	applied	
fields.	Mentioned	in	the	same	breath	by	
many		–	e.g.	Sanders	(1993),	Heft	(2001);	
Carman	(1999);	Dotov	et	al(2012)	–Gibson	
and	Merleau-Ponty	are	evoked	often	in	
discussions	concerning ‘embodiment’	
and ‘affordance’.			Donald	Norman	has	
recently	commented	on	the	‘separate 
lives’	Gibson’s	concept	of	affordance	
leads	contemporaneously	in	diverse	fields	
(including	ecological	psychology,	design,	
and	engineering	design),	and	noted	that	
a	‘comprehensive‘	overview	by	Dotov	et	
al	(2012)	ignores	the	work	outside	of	their	
own	field	of	perceptual	and	ecological	
psychology	(Norman,	2015).	We	should	
note	that	architecture	is	not	mentioned	by	
Norman	in	the	list	of	disciplines	discussing	
affordance	–	while	a	recent	article	by	Aaron	
Betsky	(2015)	calls	it	the	new	‘buzzword’	
in	architecture	schools	and	firms	alike.		
Certainly	architecture	has	been	engaging	
with	concepts	of	embodiment	(if	not	the	idea	
of	‘affordance’)	for	some	time,	and	there	will	
be	more	discussion	and	development	in	the	
future	–	see,	for	example,	Mallgrave	(2013),	
Robinson	&	Pallasmaa	(2015).
As	Dotov	et	al	(2012,	p.35-36)	have	noted,	
Gibson	and	Merleau	Ponty	have	been	
noted	as	‘similar’…in	regards	to	the	concept	
of	‘reciprocity’	between	perceiver	and	
environment	that	comes	into	play	within	
existential	philosophy,	Gestalt	psychology	
and	Gibsonian	ecological	perception	theory.		
	
The	similarity	between	Gibson	and	Martin	
Heidegger	and	Maurice-Merleau-Ponty	has	
been	pointed	out	a	number	of	times	(Dreyfus	
1996;	Heft	2001;	Kadar	&	Effken	1994).	
Compare	their	ways	of	bridging	the	subject-
object	divide: “An affordance is neither an 
objective property nor a subjective property; 
or it is both if you like”	(Gibson	1979:	129)	and	
“Perceivedness … is in a certain way objective, 
in a certain way subjective, yet neither of the 
two” (Heidegger	1982:	314).	
The	umwelten,	the	perceiver-centered	
animal-relative	worlds	of	von	Uexküll	(1957),	
also	converge	with	Gibson’s	thinking––more	
specifically	with	the	way	an	affordance-
structure	defines	an	animal’s	niche	
(Chemero	2009).	We	do	not	know	if	Gibson	
was	familiar	with	von	Uexküll’s	work	but	
both	Merleau-Ponty	and	Heidegger	read	
von	Uexküll,	and	Gibson	was	familiar	with	
Merleau-Ponty	(Heft	2001:	161).	There	are	
several	other	theorists	whose	ideas	were	
closely	related	to	Gibson’s	affordance	
concept	but	who	were	representationalists.	
These	include	Egon	Brunswik	and	the	
Gestalt	psychologists.
Taylor	Carman	(1999,	pp.221–222)	accurately	
highlights	the	consilience	between	Merleau	
Ponty	and	Gibson	in	their	understanding	
of	the	body	as	a	“permanent structure of 
perception”.…Merleau-Ponty’s	thick	conception	
of	perceptual	agency	already	implicates	the	
body	in	all	perceptual	acts.	Our	ongoing	
background	perception	of	our	own	bodies	is	
nothing	like	an	object-directed	awareness	
focused	on	any	of	its	distinct	parts,	as	for	
example	when	we	locate	tactile	sensations	
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on	our	skin	or	in	our	joints.	Our	sense	of	
embodiment	is	bound	up	instead	with	a	
primitive	understanding	of	the	body	as	a	
global	and	abiding	horizon	of	perceptual	
experience.	For	Merleau-Ponty,	my	body	simply	
“is my point of view on the world” (PP,	70).	
The	body,	then,	is	a	permanent	structure	
of	perception,	over	and	beyond	the	
peculiar	features	of	any	one	of	the	five	
traditionally	differentiated	senses.	Indeed,	
as	J.J.	Gibson	has	argued	in	his	“ecological”	
theory	of	perception,	all	the	senses	play	
a	role	in	the	combination	of	kinesthesis	
and	perception	of	external	objects,	that	is,	
between	proprioception	and	exteroception:	
“Proprioception or self-sensitivity is seen to be 
an overall function, common to all systems, 
not a special sense”.	Like	Gibson,	for	example,	
Merleau-Ponty	insists	that “all the senses are 
spatial, if they are to give us access to some 
form or other of being, if, that is, they are 
senses at all”	(PP,	217).	Perception	is	holistic,	
and	the	body’s	background	self-awareness	
is	one	of	its	permanent	horizons: “External 
perception and the perception of one’s own 
body vary in conjunction because they are the 
two facets of one and the same act”	(PP,	205).	
My	interest,	however,	in	the	two	theorists,	
lies	in	a	deeper	specificity.	I	have	sought	
to	follow	their	thoughts	on	light	(light/
darkness/colour),	which	I	have	not	seen	
comprehensively	gathered,	or	discussed	
together	in	any	depth,	with	specific	reference	
to	architectural	theory	or	practice.	The	term	
‘gathered’	is	apropos,	particularly	in	the	case	
of	Merleau	Ponty,	as	his	observations	on	light	
(and	discussion	of	psychological	studies	on	
perception)	are	interspersed	throughout	
his	work.	I	have	found	(in	their	writings)	
what	I	believe	is	an	important	discussion	
for	architecture	today…about	the	role	light	
(light/colour/	darkness)	plays	in	embodied	
and	lived	experience	in	architecture.	
As	noted	earlier,	through	my	own	practice-
based	research	findings,	I	have	found,	over	
time,	conceptual	understandings	that	are	
in	alignment	with	the	ideas	about	light	
expressed	by	these	two	thinkers…and	that	
support	my	doctoral	thesis	that	light	itself	
can	be	a	potent	affordance	and,	therefore,	a	
valuable	formative	driver	of	a	re-imagined	
architecture	for	birth.	What	I	mean	by	this	
will	be	clarified	at	the	end	of	the	article.
I	begin	the	discussion	with	a	concise	list	of	
‘points of consilience’ between	Gibson	and	
Merleau-Ponty	¬–	I	have	distilled	these	from	
my	own	comparison	of	their	key	concepts.		
Section	2	introduces	light	as	an	aspect	
of	‘embodied experience’	as	thematically	
explored	in/through	the	two	theorists’	works.	
Section	3	concludes	with	a	condensation	of	
my	preliminary	understandings	relevant	to	
architectural/environmental	design	in	general,	
and	birthspace	as	a	particular	special	case.
1. Ecological and Phenomenological 
Perception: Points of Consilience
It	is	useful,	I	propose,	to	begin	from	a	
position	of	understanding	that	underscores	
the	consilience	between	Gibson	(1979)	and	
Merleau-Ponty	(2015;	1968).	Therefore,	I	have	
prepared	the	following	list	that	I	believe	
captures	the	key	points	relevant	to	this	
discussion,	and	that	concerns	perception,	
perceiver	and	environment/world.	
Both	theorists	consistently:
1)	 rejected	’non-aliveness’,	or	a	mechanical	
view	of	the	world
2)	 argued	against	reductivist/dualist	models	
of	human	perception
3)	 opposed	the	concept	of	abstract	space	(of	
physics)	as	the	‘map’	that	can	situate	our	
‘place’,	our	‘here’
4)	 asserted	that	the	agency	of	the	perceiver-
in-motion	is	crucial	to	embodied	
experience	
5)	 proposed	a	deep	reciprocity	between	
perceiver	and	environment	
6)	 posited	that	our	body/perceptual	
system	evolved	with/through	nature,	
and	hence	directly	understands	nature’s	
environmental	visual/sensory	‘language’	
7)	 found	that	‘mobility’	in	space	was	
fundamental	to	‘perception’.
From	this	strong		common	grounding	
that	underscores		the	interrelationship	of	
person	and	environment,		we	can	begin	to	
address	a	topic	that	is	as	yet	invisible	in	the	
list….	light.		By	light,	I	should	clarify,	I	mean,	
always,	the	inseparable	trio	light/darkness/
colour.	They	are	as	inseparable	as	mind	and	
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“a transcendent feature 
of the universe or of 
disembodied mind.” Rather, 
it is “shaped crucially by 
the peculiarities of our 
human bodies, by the 
remarkable details of the 
neural structure of our 
brains, and by the specifics 
of our everyday functioning 
in the world”. 
body,	though	like	mind/body,	they	are	often	
studied	separately.	
2. Light and  Embodied Experience
Cosmicity:	A	first	principle	about	light	and	
space/place	is	the	cosmological.	I	make	the	
point	to	my	students	that	each	building	site	
in	the	world	is	unique	in	its	relationship	to	
the	sun,	and	in	the	opportunities	that	this	
situation	holds	for	making	architectural	
experience	that	situates	us	in	the	world/the	
cosmos.	Further,	quantum	physicist	Arthur	
Zajonc	reminds	us	that	light	is	invisible,	until	
we	put	something	in	its	way.	Only	then	do	
we	see	light	(cite).	This	important	conceptual	
understanding	is,	or	I	suggest,	ought	to	be,	at	
the	heart	of	architecture	and	the	making	of	
human	experience	in	architecture.	
Light	gives	to	us	our	largest-scale	sense	of	
place.	An	important	artist	of	our	time	whose	
work	has	centered	on	colour	and	light,	James	
Turrell	(2013)	speaks	of	our ‘being in space’	–	in	
the	cosmos…he	notes	that	this	fundamental	
awareness	is	diminished	by	nighttime	urban	
lighting.	Gaston	Bachelard,	author	of	the	
acclaimed	text	The	Poetics	of	Space,	writing	
in	the	same	decade	as	Gibson	and	Merleau	
Ponty,	lamented	our	loss	of	‘cosmicity’	in	the	
urban	life	of	his	time	(1969,	pp.26–27).	We	
have	moved	much	further	in	this	direction	
since	he	mentioned	the	problem.	
For	Gibson,	an	overarching	aspect	of	light	is	
this	provision	of	cosmic	orientation.	Gibson	
describes	the	three	key	elements	of	our	
environment	–	the	medium,	surface	and	
substance. ‘The medium’ –	the	air/water	
in	which	earth’s	creatures	move,	“has an 
intrinsic polarity of up and down”	–	light	
comes	from	above,	gravity	pulls	downwards.	
Our	world	has	an			‘absolute axis’	of	reference,	
the	vertical	axis.	Unlike	the ‘space’	of	physics:	
“Even the two horizontal axes of reference 
are not wholly arbitrary, for they depend on 
sunrise and sunset”	(1979,	pp.26–27).
Gibson	reminds	us,	too,	of	the	“moving source 
of illumination” built	into		our	perceptual	
system:	The motion of the sun across the sky 
from sunrise to sunset has been for countless 
millions of years a basic regularity of nature. It 
is a fact of ecological optics and a condition of 
the evolution of the eye in terrestrial animals. 
But its importance for the theory of vision has 
not been fully recognised….(1979,	p.87).
This,	of	course,	is	not	something	we	can	
discover	in	a	laboratory.	And	our	ideas	about	
lighting	the	built	environment	have	come	
closer	to	a	laboratory	concept	of	human	
perception	–	where	a	subject ‘waits for’ 
something	to	happen,	and	then	we	capture	
their	response…	we	have	been	focused,	for	
many	years,	on	lighting	rooms	and	spaces	
with ‘even’ and	measurable	light	-	working	
from	a	static/controlled	notion	of	space/time.
Gibson	describes	our	experience	of	symmetry	
in	the	pattern	of	light	and	dark	in	which	we	
live:	…all the surfaces that were lighted in the 
morning will be shaded in the afternoon, and 
those that were shaded in the morning will be 
lighted in the afternoon. There is a continual, 
if slow, process of change from lighted to 
shaded on certain slopes of the layout and the 
reverse change on certain other slopes. These 
slopes are related by orientation (1979,	p.87,	
my	emphasis).
Merleau-Ponty,	by	contrast,	uses	theatrical	
lighting	as	his	metaphor	for	our	intrinsic	
experience	of	light	(still	noting	the	richness	
and	play	of	shadow	and	light,	tracing	out	
or	making	visible	what	we	shall	see	at	any	
given	moment):
If I imagine a theatre with no audience in 
which the curtain rises upon illuminated 
scenery, I have the impression that the 
spectacle is in itself visible or ready to be seen, 
and that the light which probes the back and 
foreground, accentuating the shadows and 
permeating the scene through and through, in 
a way anticipates our vision…by those paths 
traced out for it by the lighting…	(Merleau-
Ponty,	2002,	p.276,	my	emphasis).	
He	observes	the	infrastructural	synchronicity	
of	body	and	environment,	facilitated	through	
what	he	calls	the	gaze	–	our	engaged	
perception	in	the	world:	
Perception presupposes in us an apparatus 
capable of responding to the promptings of 
light…of concentrating diffuse visibility and 
completing what is merely foreshadowed in 
the spectacle. This apparatus is the gaze…the 
natural correlation [between what we see 
and do]…experienced as the involvement of 
our body in the typical structures of a world 
(2002,	p.276,	my	emphasis).
Light and the self
Gibson	coins	the	term	‘affordance’ to	capture	
the	notion	that	environmental	conditions	
facilitate	our	capacities	for	action.	Our	
perception,	he	says,	is	grounded	in	the	body’s	
specific	form	(the	human	body	is	bi-pedal,	
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bi-symmetrical,	vertical,	with	a	swivelling	
head/neck,	and	two	eyes).	We	are	made	for	
perception	in	motion,	and	the	‘visual array,’ 
the	light-facilitated	cone	of	our	visual	field	
moves	with	us	(1979,	p.183).	
Proprioception	(self-awareness)	is	another	
key	feature	of	Gibson’s	perceiver	–	we	see	
ourselves	in	the	picture,	always	–	we	can	
see	our	hands,	our	noses,	our	feet,	etc.	Light	
facilitates	this	capacity	to	see	ourselves,	
fundamentally,	as	part	of	our	environment.	
Interestingly,	for	Merleau-Ponty,	light	is	
affiliated	with	our	visible,	spatially	situated	
self,	and	bodily	space	is	understood	as	
‘darkness’	–	that	‘interiority’	that	we	cannot	
see	(2002,	p.32)	–similar,	he	says,	to	the	
darkness	needed	in	the	theatre	“to show 
up the performance…”	Darkness	is “the 
background of somnolence… against which 
the gesture and its aim stand out, [in which] 
precise beings, figures and points can come 
to light”.	Here	he	is	referencing	not	only	the	
darkness	of	the	audience-as-self,	but	of	the	
dark	stage	before	the	objects	and	surfaces	
within	it	are	lit.
Gibson	describes	nature	as	an	ecological	
world	in	which	there	are ‘nested’	spaces	
(worlds	into	which	we	‘fit’ well,	made	for	
us	through	natural	processes	over	deep	
time).	Darkened	spaces,	for	Gibson,	suggest	
protective ‘niches’ in	an	animal’s	territory,	
where	he/she	can	see	from,	but	cannot	not	
be	seen.	The	‘enclosed’ nature	of	darkness	
(how	else	do	we	create	it	architecturally?)	
means	that	darkness,	privacy	and	intimacy	
are	deeply	connected	(1979,	pp.120–128).	One	
is	reminded	of	the	embodied	beauty	of	the	
interior	of	a	bird’s	nest,	formed,	in	the	end,	by	
the	bird’s	body	itself.
Light and Constancy 
Light	and	 ‘constancy’ 	are	inseparable	aspects	
of	perceptual	understanding.	‘Constancy’ 
is	the	term	in	perceptual	theories	that	
refers	to	our	recognition	of	the ‘sameness’ 
of	something	despite ‘differing’ conditions	
–	e.g.		the	‘whiteness’	of	a	piece	of	paper	
in	diverse	lighting	conditions.	Perceptual	
constancy	applies	across	various	areas	of	
visual	experience,	and	provides	consistency	
and	reliability	–	our	capacity	to	recognise	
similarities,	to	find	the	world	‘familiar’.			
In	the	introduction	to	Merleau-Ponty’s	last,	
posthumously	published	work,	The	Visible	
and	the	Invisible	(Merleau-Ponty	and	Lefort,	
1968,	p.L),	translator	Alphonso	Lingis	points	
to	the	resonant	implications	of		‘constancy’ 
for	Merleau-Ponty’s	study	of	lived	experience.	
Constancy	can	be	understood	as	the	unity	
we	experience	in	the	world,	in	which	variety	
is	always	implicit.	He	says:	“Perception is not 
first perception of things, but perception of 
elements…which are dimensions, which are 
worlds …Once we have understood that the 
thing is a dimensional this,  we [understand] 
that the vision of the rose is already an 
introduction into rosiness, into the species 
rose, into a family of like beings”	(p.	174)…to	
be	introduced	into	a	style	of	visible	being	is	
already	to	be	introduced	to	the	pregnancy	
of	that	style.	And	pregnancy,	Merleau-Ponty	
tells	us,	means	not	only	typicality,	but	also	
productivity,	or	generativity.
For	both	Merleau-Ponty	and	Gibson,	
constancy	is	the	unity	required	for	the	variety	
that	(invariably)	accompanies	it.	The	terms	
Gibson	uses	are	Invariance	and	Variance.	
In	describing	the	opportunities	given	to	us	
by	‘the medium’	or ‘ether’	in	which	we	live/
move,	Gibson	lists	six	‘invariant’	affordances	
–	what	we	are	enabled	to	do	(all	but	the	first	
related	to	light)	:	1)	respiration	(breathing)	
2)	locomotion	(movement)	3)	illumination	
(seeing)	4)	vibrations	and	emanations	(sound,	
smell)		5)	homogeneity	(solidity	of	material)		
6)	vertical	axis	of	reference	(orientation).	
Implicit	in	all	these	‘invariants’	(things	we	
can	count	on)	is	the	idea	that ‘variance’ 
exists	within	them;	and	this	‘changeability’	
is	built	into	our	agile	and	yet	always	situated	
perceptual	system.	As	we	actively	engage	
in	our	‘tasks of survival’,	illumination,	from	
any	point	within	the	medium,	provides	
an ‘ambient array’ which	serves	our	
‘navigational system’ with	information	(both	
variant	and	invariant),	refreshed	moment	by	
moment	(1979,	pp.16–17).			
In	his	own	‘systems’ approach,	Merleau-
Ponty	(2002,	pp.279–80)	tells	us	that	there	
are	three	co-existing	elements	of	‘colour/
light constancy’.	They	are:	1)	the	lighting,	2)	
the	‘organisation	of	the	field’	as	our	body	
contrives	it,	and	3)	the	thing	illuminated	
in	its	constancy.	Merleau-Ponty	notices	
that ‘constancy of colour’	is	related	to	our	
immersion	in	surroundings	(the	field)	–	it	
only	appears	when	we	move	close	enough	
to	what	we	are	observing	that	it	becomes	
an	intimate	part	of	our	surroundings	–	that	
is,	when	we	‘become	one	with	it’.	Whatever	
the	colour	shift	in	ambient	lighting	(say	
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from	daylight	to	incandescent	light),	
our	perceptual	system	uses	‘constancy’ 
to	compensate	for	it,	so	that	it	becomes	
‘neutral or normal’	(stabilised)	in	our	close-
up	perception	of	the	objects,	surfaces,	and	
substances	in	this	localised	environment:
The	level	[of	ambient	light]	is	laid	down,	
and	with	it	all	the	colour	values	dependent	
upon	it,	as	soon	as	we	begin	to	live	in	the	
prevailing	atmosphere…Taking	up	our	
abode	in	a	certain	setting	of	colour,	with	
the	transposition	which	it	entails,	is	a	bodily	
operation,	and	I	cannot	effect	it	otherwise	
than	by	entering	in	to	the	new	atmosphere,	
because	my	body	is	my	general	power	of	
inhabiting	all	the	environments	which	
the	world	contains,	the	key	to	all	those	
transpositions	and	equivalences	which	keep	
it	constant	(my	emphasis).
	
The	language	here	is	succinct	and	emphatic:	
it	is	my	body	that	is	the	‘power’,	the ‘key’	to	
constancy.	But	I	have	also	emphasised	the	
language	here	that	repeatedly	speaks	of	
‘taking up abode.’	“Lighting and the constancy 
of the thing illuminated,”	says	Merleau-
Ponty, “…are directly dependent on our bodily 
situation”	(2002,	p.310).	As	we	move	into	
close	range,	we	adjust…the	environment	
adjusts,	as	it	were.	We	become	attuned	to	
one	another	through	coming	together.	
The	‘phenomenal body’,	this	body	that	
knows,	is	invoked	implicitly	in	the	distinction	
between	‘lighting’	and	‘the	thing	lit’	(2002,	
p.278)	–	what	we	might	call	respectively	the	
ambience	in	which	we	find	ourselves	and	the	
light	that	illuminates	a	particular	element	in	
view:	…the object lighted stands out before us 
and confronts us. The lighting is neither colour 
nor, in itself, even light, it is anterior to the 
distinction between colours and luminosities. 
This is why it always tends to become ‘neutral’ 
for us. The penumbra in which we are becomes 
so natural that it is no longer even perceived 
as penumbra.  (emphasis	in	original)
	
The	word	‘penumbra’	suggests	a	darkening…
that	is	an	interiority…we	are	in	architectural	
space,	in	this	reading,	whether	day	or	night.	
The	point	Merleau-Ponty	makes	may	seem	
obscure	–	what	is	the	‘lighting’	if	it	is	not	
‘light’	–	but	the	reminder	is	that	there	is	
an	ambient	condition	present	already,	
that	qualitatively	shifts	our	architectural	
experience	and	engagement,	and	that	has	
a	foundational	homogeneity.	We	bring	
our	adjustment	with	us	as	we	enter	into	a	
particular	spatial	setting	and	colour	and	light	
adjust	with	us.	
Light and Surface
Light/darkness/colour,	as	we	have	seen,	
cannot	be	separated	from	‘environmental’	
or	‘bodily’	orientation.	But	further,	our	
relationship	with	light	is	mediated	through	
the	materiality	of	the	world…that	is,	through	
light’s	interactions	with	‘surfaces’	and	
’substances.’
Merleau-Ponty	describes	“a topography 
unfolding by differentiation, by segregations 
[holding together] through the reflections, 
shadows, levels and horizons between things”	
(1968,	p.160).		For	Gibson,	this	is	a	valid	
description	of	ecological	perception:	colour	
and	texture,	inseparables	modulated	and	
revealed	by	light,	provide	affordances	for	
living	in	the	world,	passing	on	information	
about	materiality	that	we	understand…
about	“composition of the substance [as] 
important for survival, safety and wellbeing”	
(1979,	pp.30–31).	
Merleau	Ponty’s	(2002,	p.162)	sense	of		
embodied	perception	through	surface/
substance	goes	deeper,	into	psycho-
physiological	resonance.	He	tells	us	that	
perceiving	colour,	e.g.	“mat red”	is	not	first	
a	‘sensation’,	and	then	a	‘motor reaction’	
(a	bodily	feeling).	It	is	rather	“a power 
which is born into…a certain existential 
environment…”	and	this	‘synchronisation’ 
or	‘power’	that	colour	is	in	the	body	(that	it	
offers,	that	we	‘lean into’)	is	likened	to	the	
way	we	fall	asleep.	One	voluntarily	prepares	
to	sleep,	and	“suddenly it is as if my mouth 
were connected to some great lung outside 
myself which alternately calls forth and 
forces back my breath”.	Similarly,	he	notes,	“I 
surrender a part of my body, even my whole 
body, to this particular manner of vibrating 
and filling space known as blue or red”.
 
Again,	in	concert	with	Gibson,	Merleau-
Ponty	(Ibid,	pp.183–184)	observes: “This red 
would literally not be the same if it were not 
the ‘woolly red’ of a carpet. Analysis, then, 
discovers in each quality meanings which 
reside in it.”	He	describes	the	interwoven	
relations	between	light,	colour,	materiality	
and	perception	in	ways	that	Gibson	would	
have	appreciated:	
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“…each colour, in its inmost depths, is nothing 
but the inner structure of the thing overtly 
revealed. The brilliance of gold palpably holds 
out to us its homogenous composition…
The senses intercommunicate by opening 
onto the structure of the thing. One sees the 
hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, 
with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is 
conveyed by the visible glass.  One sees the 
springiness of steel, the ductility of red-hot 
steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the 
softness of shavings. The form of objects is not 
their geometrical shape: it stands in a certain 
relation to their specific nature, and appeals 
to all our other senses as well as sight”. 
Another	finely-tuned	observation	of	his	
comes	very	close	to	the	Gibsonian	‘reading’	
of	environment…how	affordances	are	
communicated:	“In the jerk of the twig 
from which a bird has just flown, we read 
its flexibility or elasticity, and it is thus that 
a branch of an apple-tree or a birch are 
immediately distinguishable” (2002,	p.184).
3. Considerations for architectural design and 
implications for birthspace
The	passage	above	shows	the	careful	and	
extensive ‘empathic observation’	(Seamon	
and	Zajonc,	1998)	that	both	Merleau-Ponty	
and	Gibson	utilised	in	considering	light	in	
environment.	I	find	that	their	sensitivity	and	
insight	into	the	structure	and	meaning	of	
embodied	experience	has	supported	my	own	
interest	and	research	into	light	as	a	central	
aspect	and		affordance	of	the	re-imagined	
birth	experience.	The	following	list	offers	a	
glimpse	of	the	concepts	emerging	from	my	
practice-based	research	that	are	connected	
with	the	ideas	expressed	in	the	work:
1)	 Materiality	is	meaningful	–	not	
simply	as	visual	aesthetics	but	as	fully	
embodied	experiential	information,	for	
communicating	affordances	provided	in	a	
given	space
2)	 Colour	and	textural	properties	are	
not	separable,	the	resonance	is	in	the	
colour	as	deeply	structural	material	
understandings
3)	 	Light	(light/darkness/colour)	should	be	
used	with	awareness	of	the	resonance/
feeling	it	generates	in	the	body
4)	 Colour/material/light	interacting	creates	
variety/aliveness	and	agency	for	action	
–	that	is,	movement	and	sensory,	bodily	
activation	conducive	to	birth	processes.
5)	 Light	(natural	light)	provides	fundamental	
orientation	and	deep	familiarity	through	
the	body,	through	the	moving	body
6)	 Agency,	personal	intentionality,	is	at	the	
heart	of	embodied	perception,	and	light	is	
implicated.	
I	conclude	with	the	thought,	which	requires	
further	elaboration	(forthcoming)	that	the	
design	approaches	we	choose	to	utilise	
for	reimagining	birthspace	should	be	
concerned	with	both	deeply	felt	orientation	
and	sensitive	empowerment	of	action….
and	that	light	can	play	an	important	role	in	
providing	these.	Movement,	situated	agency,	
a	sense	of	belonging,	temporal	experience,	
the	body,	and	sense	of	place	and	light	are	
inseparably	interwoven.	If	we	can	find	these	
understandings	valuable	for	birthspace,	
then	we	can	also	find	them	useful	for	
furthering	the	ways	in	which	human	needs	
and	desires	can	be	addressed	through	
phenomenologically	sensitive		
architectural	design.
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